THE JURISPRUDENCE OF POETIC LICENSE
CALVIN R. MASSEY* Whatever its contribution to the corpus of first amendment law, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Texas v. Johnson I provides a dismaying example of the use of history as a rationale for decision. Legal historians have long felt compelled to justify, or at least explain, the reasons for bothering to inquire into law's musty attic. Predictably, those explanations have assumed a variety of forms. One popular version is to the effect that the study of legal history will provide a guide to formulate present and future legal policy. 2 Opposed to this notion is the idea that knowledge of legal history "explain [s] , and therefore lighten [s] , the pressure that the past must exercise upon the present, and the present upon the future. Today we study the day before yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyze today, and today may not paralyze tomorrow." '3 In this view, "[f]aw must grow through re-interpretation of the past," '4 whether by exposing past error, pointing out prior foundational postulates now rejected, or simply by making clear the particular and contingent quality of legal reasoning over time. 5 Related to this latter perspective is the contention that history never can fully answer our * Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. I wish to thank Brian Gray for inspiring me to commit these thoughts to paper and Adam Hirsch for bringing to my attention some of the explanations which have been advanced for studying legal history.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2533 Ct. (1989 . This is, of course, the "flag-burning" case, in which the Court overturned Texas' prosecution of Johnson for burning a United States flag as part of a political demonstration on the ground that Texas had no interest in regulating Johnson's conceded act of symbolic speech which was unrelated to the speech element of Johnson's conduct. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Johnson appears to fall into the first of these categories. He begins with the familiar and opaque observation of Justice Holmes that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." '7 Perhaps Justice Holmes meant by this to embrace the idea that, like a picture that is worth a thousand words, history is a clearer guide to action than logic. If so, the aphorism may be taken to mean that we ought slavishly to emulate past practice.
But we have never done this, for almost any "page of history" will reveal that our history is not a single snapshot but a continually running motion picture. The second Justice Harlan thought that "history teaches ... the traditions from which [the nation's constitutional jurisprudence] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing." 8 Indeed, one of the oldest of American traditions has been that while Americans "have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience." 9 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist may have invoked Holmes for the purpose of placing himself in the camp of those who see historical practice as the ratio decidendi for the present and future, he then proceeded to rely upon a patchwork history that, while it may have proved the obvious fact that the American flag has been a symbol of the nation for its entire existence, contained at least one instance of sheer fantasy. According to the Chief Justice, "One of the greatest stories of the Civil War is told in John Greenleaf Whittier's poem, Barbara Frietchie." 10 The entire poem is then recited, setting forth the story that, when the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia advanced through the town of Frederick, Maryland in September of 1862, the elderly Union-loyal Barbara Frietchie had the courage to display the American flag even in the face of gunfire from Stonewall Jackson's troops." 1 It may be a "great story," but In her attic window the staff she set, To show that one heart was loyal yet.
Up the street came the rebel tread, Stonewall Jackson riding ahead.
Under his slouched hat left and right He glanced; the old flag met his sight.
"Halt!" -the dust-brown ranks stood fast. "Fire!" -out blazed the rifle-blast.
It shivered the window, pane and sash; It rent the banner with seam and gash.
Quick, as it fell, from the broken staff Dame Barbara snatched the silken scarf.
She leaned far out on the window-sill, And shook it forth with a royal will.
"Shoot, if you must, this old gray head, But spare your country's flag," she said.
A shade of sadness, a blush of shame, Over the face of the leader came;
The nobler nature within him stirred To life at that woman's deed and -word; "Who touches a hair of yon gray head Dies like a dog! March on!" he said.
All day long through Frederick street Sounded the tread of marching feet;
All day long that free flag tost Over the heads of the rebel host. What can we make of this sort of triviality? Perhaps it is wise not to make too much of anything out of it, but at least it is fair to ask whether the law of the Constitution ought to be driven by poetic fancy masquerading as history. There is absolutely no doubt that the American flag is a symbol of enormous emotional significance. 1 8 State prosecutions of its destruction as a political protest raise important issues in the shadowy turf of "conduct-as-speech." 19 To resolve those issues by resort to emotion laden poetic fantasy, especially when the fantasy is palmed off as genuine history, debases historical coin, cheapens the process of constitutional adjudication, and even embarrasses the poet. message, they have utterly fused speech and non-speech. With that fusion comes the impossibility of regulating the "non-speech" element of the symbol's destruction, for it is dissolved in the powerful solvent of pure symbol. See Massey, Pure Symbols and the First Amendment, 17 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. (forthcoming 1990).
19. Compare Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2534 (1989) (noting that while the Court has rejected characterizing a limitless variety of conduct as speech, conduct may be "'sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the first and fourteenth amend. ments' ") (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) ) with id. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding that the act of desecration turns on "whether those who view the act will take serious offense" and not on the "substance of the message the actor intends to convey").
